The four sub-tasks of SecureNLP build towards a capability for quickly highlighting critical information from malware reports, such as the specific actions taken by a malware sample. Digital Operatives (DO) submitted to sub-tasks 1 and 2, using standard text analysis technology (text classification for sub-task 1, and a CRF for sub-task 2). Performance is broadly competitive with other submitted systems on sub-task 1 and weak on subtask 2. The annotation guidelines for the intermediate sub-tasks create a linkage to the final task, which is both an annotation challenge and a potentially useful feature of the task. The methods DO chose do not attempt to make use of this linkage, which may be a missed opportunity. This motivates a post-hoc error analysis. It appears that the annotation task is very hard, and that in some cases both deep conceptual knowledge and substantial surrounding context are needed in order to correctly classify sentences.
Introduction
The SecureNLP challenge is motivated by (Lim et al., 2017) and further described in (Phandi et al., 2018) , it aims to provide automation for malware analysts who might otherwise be overwhelmed by the task of finding key data in long threat reports. The annotation guidelines used to create the task ask analysts to include actions carried out by the malware, but exclude actions carried out by the human designers of the malware. These actions are related to the MAEC cybersecurity ontology (Kirillov et al., 2010) . The guidelines include one substantial caveat:
As a general guide [for a positive annotation], the sentence should imply a particular malware action or capability, with reference to the list of attribute labels. [i.e. the MAEC labels] Sub-task 1 calls for a determination of relevance or irrelevance to malware activity on a per-sentence basis. However a number of issues make this difficult. See detail in (Lim et al., 2017) . First, it is not obvious what to do when a sentence describes malware activity but does not fit in with any MAEC category. Second, the distinction between things done by the malware and things done (or intended) by its designers is not easy to maintain.
We describe the systems that we built for tasks 1 and 2 and use them to conduct ablation studies and error analyses.
Digital Operatives Systems
The Digital Operatives submission used spaCy (Honnibal and Johnson, 2015) . to generate features for each token, then aggregated the features from the whole sentence. To estimate performance, we used 5-fold cross-validation on the combined training and development sets.
As an example, consider the word "ago" in the sentence:
"A few days ago we detected a watering hole campaign in a website owned by one big industrial company ."
We extract:
• the word itself
• the lemmatized form provided by spaCy,
• the orthographic shape (all lower case, represented as "xxx")
• the part-of-speech ("ADV")
• the detailed part-of-speech ("RB")
• Brown cluster (6442) (Brown et al., 1992) • the fact that it does or does not look like a URL
• the bigrams in which it participates ("days ago" and "ago we")
• similar bigrams for lemma, Brown cluster and shape.
• extract features from dependency links. Each token has a head from which it depends, and the relation that it holds to the head has a name. The head of "ago" is the verb "detected", and the relation is "advmod". We package this up into the feature detected-ADVMOD-ago.
• features of the form X-advmod-Y where X and Y are either both cluster ids or both orthographic shapes.
The result is passed to a passive aggressive classifier (Crammer et al., 2006) 1 . This learner, which is similar in cost and performance to a linear kernel SVM and to a number of other linear classifiers, seems to be close to the best choice from a large number of experiments. Grid search was used to choose the C regularization parameter for the classifier. On our 5 validation splits this method had a mean f1 of 0.60 with standard deviation 0.045. Performance on the actual test set was lower, at 0.52. This was rank 5 among the 11 submitted systems, well behind the top 2 systems and slightly ahead of the organizers' benchmark.
Our system classifies each sentence in isolation. No attempt was made to establish the referents of pronouns.
For sub-task 2 we used CRFsuite (Okazaki, 2007) to implement a linear-chain conditional random field. Per-word features were: the lowercased word and its part-of-speech tag; a two-letter prefix of the word; two-and three-letter character prefixes of the word; shape indicators for whether the word is numeric, title-case or upper-case; indicators for whether the word is beginning or end of sentence; the nltk part of speech of previous and subsequent words, if present; the shape indicators of previous and subsequent words, if present. We would have preferred to use features from spaCy, as in task 1, but did not overcome tokenization differences in time. This system was not competitive, with an F-score of 0.16 and a ranking of 9th. The best system had an F1 score of 0.39. 1 In scikit-learn's implementation (Pedregosa et al., 2011) 
Ablation study
The submitted system used all the features generated by spaCy. We augmented this with ablation studies in which only subsets of the features were used. The best performance came using only unigrams and bigrams derived from lemmas, along with dependency features derived from lemmas. Ablation actually improved performance over the submission, as shown in 
Task analysis
MAEC labels classify malware along several dimensions. We focus on a tractable subset that can be assigned to Actions and that describe capabilities of malware. Table 2 lists these labels.
Error analysis
We carried out our own annotation of the 112 examples from the test set for which our system did not agree with the organizers annotations. To these we added a further 111 randomly chosen examples from the test set, for which our system did agree. We assessed each of these examples against the 20 categories from table 2, There were differences of judgment between our annotations and those of the organizers. Potential reasons for this include simple errors, misunderstandings, and consequences of the linkage between sub-task 1 and sub-task 4. Table 4 shows performance when using the new annotations. There are now 72 false positives in the complete test set and 13 false negatives. True positives now slightly outnumber false positives, at 88. It is of course possible that some of our annotations are unintentionally biased in our favor. See table 3. In future work, it may be beneficial to apply the crowdsourcing methods and careful evaluation of annotation found in, for example, (Snow et al., 2008 Cozyduke was used throughout these attacks to harvest and exfiltrate sensitive information to the attackers . 1 0 exfiltration
Cozyduke will periodically contact these websites to retrieve task information to be executed on the local machine .
Execute contents in unlabeled textbox1 as a SQL query and return binary data to adversary.
1 exfiltration
The malware hides behind numerous layers of encryption and obfuscation and is capable of quietly stealing and exfiltrating sensitive information such as email from the victim's computer
To communicate with the C&C -server , the Trojan makes use of asymmetric encryption with a hardcoded pair of private and public keys .
1 0 c&c 
Discussion and conclusions
We suspected that the secure NLP task is difficult (Lim et al., 2017) . Results bear this out:
• Our post-hoc annotation study suggests that it is indeed difficult to distinguish between things done by attackers and things done by malware.
• Often, the system described is distributed, consisting of downloaded malware, websites and C&C servers. The MAEC classification and the SecureNLP annotation guidelines emphasize measurable properties of malware samples. This puts tension into the annotation scheme and may well be a contributor to annotation errors.
• A more extensive effort using multiple annotators and reformulated guidelines could be beneficial.
• With the technology that we used, analysts relying on the classifier's judgment as a filter will still need to read approximately double the number of sentences that actually contain relevant information, and will miss 10% to 20% of the relevant material, which the classifier regards as irrelevant.
